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TECHNICAL APPENDIX
I.

NOTATION

Definitions
x: level of injurer A's care.
31:due care standard for A.
x*: efficient level of care for A.
y: level of injurer B's care.
7: due care standard for B.
y*: efficient level of care for B.
a: A's likelihood of insolvency or absence.
fl: B's likelihood of insolvency or absence.
ac, tc: critical likelihood of insolvency or absence for A and B.
A(x): A's care costs.
B(y): B's care costs.
p(x): probability of accident in single injurer case.
p(x,y): probability of accident in multiple injurer case.
D: victim's accident damages.
Sa: A's share of victim's accident damages.
Sb: B's share of victim's accident damages.
Assumptions
B(1): Ax(x ) > 0; Axx(X) > 0
B(2): By(y) > 0; Byy(y) > 0
B(3): Px(X) < 0; Pxx(x) > 0
B(4): pxx(x,y) > 0; pyy(x,y) > 0
B(5): F(') = A's care costs + A's expected liability.
B(6): G(.) = B's care costs + B's expected liability.
B(7): R---x*;y = y*
B(8): 0 < Sa < 1,0 < Sb
1,andSa + Sb = 1.
B(9): 0<a Z1;0 _3< 1.
II. SINGLE INJURER CASE
PROPOSITION 1: Under a negligence rule where the due care standard, Y, equals the efficient level of care, x*, an injurer takes the efficient level of care ifher likelihood of insolvency or absence is less than
the critical likelihood, ac. If her likelihood of insolvency or absence is
greater than the critical likelihood, an injurer takes less than the effi(173)
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cient level of care. At the critical likelihood, it is indeterminate how
much care she takes.
The proof is divided into two parts: Part A shows that if the injurer's likelihood of insolvency or absence equals zero (i.e., what is ordinarily assumed in economic models) then the injurer takes the due
care efficient level of care, and Part B shows that if the injurer's likelihood of insolvency or absence is greater than a critical. likelihood of
insolvency or absence, the injurer takes less than due care.
Part A
Assume that the due care standard is set at the efficient level of
care, i.e., R = x*, that the efficient level of care minimizes the sum of
care and accident costs, and that a = 0. The social loss function is
S(x) = A(x) + p(x)D
(1)
with first and second order conditions
Sx(x*)

=

Ax(x*) + px(x*)D

=

0

(2)

and
Sxx(x) = Axx(x) + Pxx(x)D > 0.
(3)
Under a negligence rule, A's loss function is
F(x) = A(x)
if x > x* (nonnegligent)

(4)
= A(x) + p(x)D

if x < x* (negligent)

and
Fx(x) = Ax(x)

if x > x*

(5)
Ax(x) + px(x)D
if x < x*.
It will be shown that A chooses x = x* and therefore will be
nonnegligent.
If A is negligent, by definition, A chooses an x, such that x < x*.
If A is negligent, we know from (4) and (1) that A's loss function is the
same as the social loss function,
F(x) = A(x%) + p(x)D = S(x).
(6)
Recall that x* minimizes S(x). This implies that for any x < x*,
F(xo) > F(x*) and therefore A would prefer x = x* over any x. <
x*. A thus prefers to take due care rather than be negligent.
If A is nonnegligent, by definition, A chooses an x such that x >
x*. If A is nonnegligent, we know from (4) that A's loss function
equals her costs of care, i.e., F(x) = A(x). Since by assumption Ax(x)
> 0, and since xO > x*, x = x* minimizes A(x) and therefore F(x).
A will thus be nonnegligent and take due care.
=

19831

TECHNICAL APPENDIX

Part B.
When one assumes that A faces an expected likelihood of insolvency or absence greater than 0, A's loss function is no longer (4), but
F(x) = A(x)
if x > x* (nonnegligent)

(7)
= A(x) + p(x)D(1-a)
with first and second derivatives
Fx(x) = Ax(x)

if x < x* (negligent)
if x > x*
(8)

-

Ax(x) + px(x)D(1-a)

if x < x*

and
Fxx(x) = Axx(x)

if x > x*

(9)
= Axx(x) + pxx(x)D(1-a) if x < x*.
It will be shown that A chooses x0 = x* if a < ac and xo < x* if
a > ac. If A is nonnegligent, A chooses x. = x*, not x0 > x*. The
reasoning is identical to that in Part A. Since F(x) = A(x) for x > x*,
and by assumption Ax(x) > 0, x* minimizes A(x) and therefore F(x).
If A is negligent, A chooses an x 0 such that x. < x*. If A is
negligent, we know from (7) that A's loss function is no longer identical
to the social loss function. A chooses an x0 that minimizes F(x) = A(x)
+ p(x)D(1-a), or
Fx(xo) = Ax(xo) + px(xo)D(1-a) = 0.
(10)
Observe that (10) implies that there are different loss minimizing
x,'s corresponding to different values of a. Moreover, the loss minimizing x0 is greater, the lower a:
OFx
48xo
8x
=

Axx(xo) T

Ox
+ pxx(xo)D(1-a) j-

or

- Dpx(xo) = 0.
(11)

Oxo
4a

_

Dpx(xo)
Axx(x) + pxx(x0)D(1-a)

From assumption B(3), px(xo) < 0, so we know that numerator
Dpx(xo) is negative, and from assumptions B(1) and B(3), we know
that the denominator is positive, implying
Oxo
< 0.
(12)
Oa
From (10) we know that A's choice of xo is a function of a, and
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from (12), if A is negligent, the greater a, the lower x.. A will be
negligent, however, if and only if the care costs of due care are greater
than the sum of the care costs and discounted expected accident costs at
a level of care less than due care. Formally, A will be negligent if and
only if
A(x*) > A(xo) + p(xo)D(1-a).
(13)
Equation (13) may be rearranged to solve for the critical a,
atc --1- A(x*) - A(xo)

(14)

p(xo)D
From (13) and (14) we can see that for a < ac, A chooses an xo= x*
and for a > ac, A chooses an x0 < x*. For a = ac, A is indifferent
between x0 = x* and an x0 < x*.
The relationship between A's loss minimizing levels of care and a
is displayed in Figure A-1.
xo

Figure A-1

X*

0

ac

a

Over the region of 0 < a < ac, A takes due care while if ac < a <
1, A takes less than due care. If a = ac, A is indifferent between due
care and x, < x*.
Figure A-1 also reveals the striking fact that A takes precipitously
less care as a increases above ac. This discontinuity stems from the
discontinuity in A's loss function (7). A always balances the marginal
savings in care costs of taking less care against the marginal costs of an
increase in expected liabilities. As a increases from 0 to ozc, A calculates
that the marginal savings in care costs of taking less than due care is
less than the marginal costs, the increase in expected liability payments.
As a increases, however, the gap between the marginal savings and
costs narrows because as a increases the marginal costs of expected liability payments fall without altering the marginal savings in care costs.
Once A finds that the marginal savings of taking less care are greater
than the marginal costs of care costs and discounted liability payments,
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i.e., where a > ac, A decides what level of care to take by reevaluating
the marginal savings and costs of taking less care. A recognizes that
once she is liable she can achieve substantial savings by reducing her
care below due care and incurring only a moderate increase in expected
damage payments. A chooses the new level of care at the point where
the marginal cost and benefit of less care are equal, and this new level
is substantially lower than the due care level.
Finally, observe that A takes less and less care where a > ac.
This is evident from (12).
2: Under a strict liability rule, an injurer always
takes less than the efficient level of care if her likelihood of insolvency
or absence is greater than zero.
PROPOSITION

Figure A-2 graphically illustrates Proposition 2. As a increases, A
continuously chooses less and less care.
Xo

Figure A-2

X*

01

a

The proof is divided into two parts: Part A shows that if the injurer's likelihood of insolvency or absence equals zero (i.e., what is ordinarily assumed in economic models) then an injurer takes the efficient
level of care; Part B shows that if the injurer's likelihood of insolvency
or absence is greater than zero, the injurer always takes less than the
efficient level of care.
Part A
Under a strict liability rule, A's loss function is the same as the
social loss function,
F(x) = A(x) + p(x)D = S(x).
(15)
A chooses an x0 that minimizes F(x). A chooses the efficient level of
care, x*, because F(x) = S(x) and x* minimizes S(x).
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Part B
Assuming A has some chance of disappearing, under the strict liability rule, A's loss function no longer is the same as the social loss
function. It is now
F(x) = A(x) + p(x)D(1-a),
(16)
with first and second derivatives,
Fx(x) = Ax(x) + px(x)D(1-a)
(17)
and
Fxx(x) - Axx(x) + pxx(x)D(1-a).
(18)
If a = 0, then A's loss function (18) is the same as in (15) and x0
- x*. However, where 0 < a < 1, since ax0 < 0, A selects an x. <
aa
x*. Therefore, for any likelihood of insolvency or absence greater than
zero, A takes less than the efficient level of care.
III.

MULTIPLE INJURER CASE

PROPOSITION 3: Under a negligence rule, where the due care
standards,Y and y, equal the efficient levels of care, x* and y*, respectively, an injurer takes the efficient level of care if her likelihood of
insolvency or absence is less than the critical likelihood.
The proof is divided into two parts: Part A shows that if the injurer's likelihood of insolvency or absence equals zero (i.e., the implicit
Golding and Landes and Posner assumption) then an injurer takes the
efficient level of care; Part B shows that if an injurer's likelihood of
insolvency or absence is greater than a critical likelihood, the injurer
takes less than due care.
Part A.
This Part is divided into two sections: section (1) shows that if
injurer A thinks that injurer B will take due care, then A will take due
care; section (2) shows that if A thinks that B will take less than due
care A will still take due care. This proof relies heavily on Golding,
supra note 5.
Assume that the due care standards are set at the efficient levels of
care for A and B, i.e., 'K x* and y
y* and that the efficient levels
of care minimize the sum of care and accident costs. Formally,
S(x,y) = A(x) + B(y) + p(xy)D
(19)
with first and second order derivatives
Sx(x*) = Ax(x*) + p(x*,y*)D = 0
(20)
Sy(y*) = B (y*) + p(x*,y*)D = 0
(21)
Sx(X*) " 0(22)
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Syy(y*) > 0

(23)

Sy (x*,y*) < Syy . Sxx
(24)
Under a negligence rule, A and B have loss functions F(x;y) and
G(y;x):
F(x;y) = A(xo)
if x 0 > x*, y < y*
(A nonnegligent, B negligent or
nonnegligent)
=A(xo) + p(xo,y)D
if xo < x*, y > y*
(A negligent, B nonnegligent) (25)
=A(xo) + p(xo,y)DSa

if xo < x*, y < y*

(A and B negligent)
and
G(y;x) = B(yo)

if Yo > Y*, x 5

x*

(B nonnegligent, A negligent or
nonnegligent)
= B(yo)" + p(x,yo)D

if Yo < Y*, x > X*

(B negligent, A nonnegligent) (26)
if Yo < Y*, x < x*
(A and B negligent).
Section (1): If A thinks that B will be nonnegligent, A takes due
care, i.e., if A thinks y > y*, A chooses x o = x*.
If A is nonnegligent, A chooses an xo > x* and from (25), A's loss
is A(xo). A chooses xo so as to minimize A(x), and since Ax(x) > 0,
this occurs where xO = x*.
If A is negligent, A chooses xo < x* which minimizes A(x) +
p(x,y*)D where x, must satipfy
Ax(xo) + px(xo,y*)D = 0.
(27)
From (20), the first order social optimum, we know
= B(yo) + p(x,yo)DSb

Ax(x*) + px(x*,y*)D = 0,

and xo = x* minimizes (27). A will thus not choose an xO < x* and
will follow the efficient standard if she thinks B will follow the
standard.
Section (2): If A thinks B will be negligent, A takes due care, i.e.,
if A thinks Yo < y*, A chooses xO = x*. The proof is by contradiction.
If A is nonnegligent, A chooses an xO > x* and A's loss is A(xo)
(25). As in section (1), A chooses xO = x* because Ax > 0 and thus
A(x) is minimized where xO = x*.
If A is negligent, A chooses xO < x*. If A and B are negligent,
then it must be true that
A(xo) + p(xo,yo)DSa < A(x*)
(28)
and
B(yo) + p(xo,yo)DSb < B(y*),
(29)
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implying
A(xo) + B(yo) + p(xo,yo)D < A(x*) + B(y*).
(30)
Because, by definition x* and y* minimize social losses ((20) and (21)),
it must be true that
A(x*) + B(y*) + p(x*,y*)D < A(xo) + B(yo) + p(xo,yo)D.(31)
Equation (31) contradicts (30) however, because p(x*,y*)D > 0.
Equation (30) therefore cannot be true and thus the conditions for A
choosing to be negligent cannot be met.
Part B
This part is also divided into two sections: section (1) shows that if
A thinks that B will take due care, A will only take due care if her
likelihood of insolvency or absence is less than her critical likelihood;
section (2) shows that if A thinks B will take less than due care, A will
still only take due care if her likelihood of insolvency or absence is less
than her critical likelihood.
While we still assume that the due care standards are set at the
efficient levels of care, i.e., R = x* and y = y*, A and B face different
loss functions from those in Part A because their likelihoods of insolvency or absence are greater than zero. A's and B's loss functions also
depend upon whether courts follow the simple or recovery liability rule.
For the moment, assume that the simple rule is controlling.
A's and B's loss functions are
F(x;y,a) = A(xo)
if Xo > x*, y
y*
(A nonnegligent, B
negligent or nonnegligent)
= A(xo) + p(xo,y)D(1-a)
if xo < x*, y > y*
(32)
(A negligent, B
nonnegligent)
= A(xo) + p(xo,y)DSa(1-a)
if xo < x*, y < y*
(A and B negligent)
and
G(y;x,f) = B(yo)
if Yo > Y*, x :_ x*
(B nonnegligent, A
negligent or nonnegligent)
= B(yo) + p(x,yo)D(1-#6)
if yo < y*, x > x*
(33)
(B negligent, A
nonnegligent)
= B(yo) = p(x,yo)DSb(1-#3)
if Yo < Y*, x < x*
(B and A negligent)
where, as before, 0 < Sa <_ 1,0 < Sb < 1 and a + Sb = 1.
Section (1): If A thinks that B will be nonnegligent, i.e., y > y*, A
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chooses xo = x* if a < a c and chooses x, < x* if a > a c . If a = a c
A is indifferent between x0 = x* and x, < x*.
If A is nonnegligent, A chooses x 0 > x* and A's loss is A(xo) (32).
A chooses an xo = x*, because, as before, Ax(xo) > 0.
If A is negligent, A chooses an x0 < x*, which minimizes A(x) +
p(x,y*)D(1-a), where x0 must satisfy
Ax(xo) + px(xo,y*)D(1-a) = 0.
(34)
Observe, however, that this is no longer the social optimum (compare
(20)). Furthermore, note that as in (12), Oxo < 0, implying that there
8a
is a set of x0 satisfying (34).
Following the reasoning of Part B of Proposition 1, A will be negligent if and only if A's care costs of due care are greater than the sum
of care and expected accident costs discounted by the likelihood of insolvency or absence at a level of care lower than the standard. Formally, A
will be negligent if
A(x*) > A(xo) + p(xo,y*)DSa(1-a).
(35)
Again following the reasoning of Part B, A's critical likelihood, ac, is
A(x*) - A(xo)
(36)
p(xo,y*)DS a
Equations (35) and (36) imply that for a < ac, A chooses x0 = x*
and for a > ac, A chooses an x0 < x*, even if B is nonnegligent. A,
therefore, may be negligent.
Section (2): If A thinks that B will be negligent, i.e., y < y*, A
chooses x0 = x* if a < ac and chooses x0 < x* if a > ac. If a = a c
A is indifferent between xo = x* and x 0 < x*.
If A is nonnegligent, i.e., A chooses x 0 > x*, and A's loss is minimized, as before, where x0 = x*.
If A is negligent, A chooses x0 < x* and if A and B both choose to
be negligent, then it must be true that
A(xo) + p(xo,yo)DSa(1-a) < A(x*)
(37)
and
B(yo) + p(xo,yo)DSb(1-#5) < B(y*).
(38)
Equations (37) and (38) imply
A(xo) + B(yo) + p(x 0,y 0)D[Sa(1-a) + Sb(l- 3 )1
< A(x*) + B(y*).
(39)
We also know, from (20) and (21), that x* and y* minimize social
losses and therefore that
A(x*) + B(y*) + p(x*,y*)D < A(xo) + B(yo) + p(xoyo)D.(40)
Equations (40) and (39) do not contradict each other because
p(xo,yo)D[Sa(1-a) + Sb(l-#)] < p(xo,yo)D
(41)
and therefore the conditions for A and B choosing to be negligent are
=

1

-
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not contradicted (compare (30) and (31)). A, therefore, may choose to
be negligent.
PROPOSITION 4:

Under a negligence standard, the recovery rule,

all else equal, increasesan injurer's critical likelihood of insolvency or
absence above her critical likelihood under the simple rule, thereby
making it more likely that she will follow a due care standardset equal
to the efficient level of care. Also, if the injurer's likelihood of insolvency or absence is greater than the recovery rule critical likelihood, the
injurer takes greater care under the recovery rule than she would
under the simple rule.
Figure A-3 graphically illustrates Proposition 4.
Figure A-3

X0

recovery rule

-H-H-H-i- simple rule

0

1

a

An injurer's critical likelihood of insolvency or absence is greater
under the recovery rule than under the simple rule, i.e., cr > a. For
a < a s , an injurer takes due care under either the simple or recovery
rule. For a s < a < a r an injurer under the recovery rule would take
due care, while an injurer under the simple rule would take less than
due care. Finally, for a r < a < 1, an injurer takes less than due care
under either the simple or recovery rule, but takes more care under the
recovery rule than the simple rule.
The proof is divided into three parts: Part A explains the difference between the recovery and simple rules; Part B shows that an injurer's critical likelihood of insolvency or absence is higher under the
recovery rule than under the simple rule; and Part C shows that if an
injurer's likelihood of insolvency or absence is greater than the simple
rule critical likelihood, the injurer takes greater care under the recovery
rule than she would under the simple rule.
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Part A
Table A-1 illuminates the difference between the recovery rule
and the simple rule. The Table shows the probability and shares that A
and B would have to pay to a victim under the two rules, assuming that
both A and B are negligent.
TABLE A-1
Case

Outcome

Probability
of
Outcome

Solvent I Insolvent
B
A
A,B

(1-a) (1-4)
(l-a) (fi)
(a) 0-0)
(a) (p)

Injurer's Share
Simple
Recovery
Rule
Rule
A
B
A
B
Sa
Sb
Sa
Sb
Sa
0 Sa+Sb
0
0
0
Sb
Sa+Sb
0
0
0
0

The Table highlights the fact that if one injurer is solvent and the
other is insolvent, under the simple rule the solvent injurer pays only
her share, while under the recovery rule, the solvent injurer pays her
share and the insolvent injurer's share. For example, in Case 2, the
probability that A would be solvent and B insolvent equals (1-a)(f#).
Under the simple rule, A's liability would be SaD and A's expected
liability would equal (1-a)(ft)SaD. Under the recovery rule, A's liability would be (Sa + Sb)D and A's expected liability would be (1-a)(,6)
(Sa + Sb)D.
The choice of the simple or recovery rule affects the injurers' loss
functions. Equations (32) and (33) accurately describe A's and B's loss
functions under the simple rule, and equations (42) and (43) describe
their loss functions under the recovery rule.
F(x;y,a,ft) = A(xo)
if Xo > x*, y
y*
(A nonnegligent, B
negligent or nonnegligent)
= A(x,) + p(xo,y)D(1-a) if x. < x*, y > y*
(42)
B
negligent,
(A
nonnegligent)
- A(x.) + p(xo,y)D(1-a)(S a + SifO)
if xo < x*, y < y*
(A and B negligent)
G(y;x,fl,a) = B(yo)
if YO > Y*, x 5 x*
(B nonnegligent, A
negligent or nonnegligent)
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if Yo < y*, x > x*

(43)

(B negligent, A
nonnegligent)
B(yo) + p(x,y)D(t-ft)(Sb + Saa)
if y < Y*, x < x*

-

(B and A negligent)
Part B
A's critical likelihood of insolvency or absence is greater'under the
recovery rule than under the simple rule.
Let A's critical likelihood of insolvency or absence equal as and ac
and level of care equal x0s and xor under the simple and recovery rules,
respectively.

'S

- 1

-

A(x*) - A(xos)

p(x0 s , y0 s ) DSa

'r

- 1

A(x*) - A(xor)

-

p(xor,yor) D(Sa + Sb#).
Whether ac' isgeater or less than a s depends upon whether
xor
x0 and y r 0 y s.We know, however, that, all else equal, if a
potential injurer knows she will be found liable she faces greater discounted liabilities under the recovery rule than under the simple rule,
i.e., DSa(1-0t) < D(Sa + Sbt$)(1-o). Moreover, it can easily be shown
that greater liability leads potential injurers to take greater care, i.e.,
s
s
X
0 o > 0. This implies that x0 < xOr at yo <

yor and

aD

it therefore follows that,
A(x s ) < A(x r )
p(x0 s , yoS)D > p(x0 r, yor)D
and therefore,
A(x*) - A(xOs )

p(xoS,yoS)DSa

<

(46)
(47)
A(x*) - A(xor)

(48)

p(xor,yor)D(Sa + Sbf).

From (44) and (45), it is thus evident that ar > as

(49)

Part C
A is more likely to take due care under the recovery rule than
under the simple rule, and if A takes less than due care, she takes
relatively more care under the recovery rule than under the simple rule.
A is more likely to take due care under the recovery rule than the

1983]

TECHNICAL APPENDIX

simple rule because for any given distribution of likelihoods of insolvency or absence in society, a larger portion of that distribution is
greater than the simple rule critical likelihood than is greater than the
recovery rule critical likelihood. This must be true because the recovery
rule critical likelihood is greater than the simple rule critical likelihood
(49).
If ac < a < a r , under the simple rule, A takes less than due care
and under the recovery rule A takes due care. A would take less than
due care under the simple rule because a > a s and would take due
care under the recovery rule because a < acr (Proposition 1).
Finally, if a' < arc < a, A would take less than due care under
either rule (Proposition 1). A* also would take relatively more care
under the recovery rule than the simple rule. This is so because A faces
greater potential expected accident costs under the recovery rule than
under the simple rule, i.e., DSa(l-a) < D(Sa + Sb#f)(1-a), thereby
inducing A to take greater care under the recovery rule. Of course, A
would not take due care even under the recovery rule because a > a.

